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制度缺陷与利益博弈——农村集体土地的所有制困境
引用本文:陈建锋. 制度缺陷与利益博弈——农村集体土地的所有制困境[J]. 湛江师范学院学报, 2010, 31(4): 48-52
作者姓名:陈建锋
作者单位:中共上海市青浦区委党校,上海,201700
摘    要:鉴于农村集体土地所有权的制度缺陷所引发的诸多问题,许多人基于促进农业发展和保护农民利益等理由,提出应从根本上改变现行农村土地制度,以土地国有化或者土地私有化取代农村集体所有权制度。农村集体土地所有制的改革涉及到农民、中央政府、地方政府、乡村权势阶层等多方利益,所有制的缺陷损害了农民的利益,但却对其他利益相关群体有利,作为政策主导的政府和权势阶层在利益博弈的过程中不可能改变现有农村土地的集体所有制。

关 键 词:制度缺陷  利益博弈  农村土地  集体所有制

Institutional Disfigurement and Profit Games Rural Collective Land: Ownership Dilemmas
CHEN Jianfeng. Institutional Disfigurement and Profit Games Rural Collective Land: Ownership Dilemmas[J]. Journal of Zhanjiang Normal College, 2010, 31(4): 48-52
Authors:CHEN Jianfeng
Affiliation:CHEN Jianfeng (The CPC Shanghai City Qingpu District Committee Party School,Shanghai 201700,China)
Abstract:Due to rural collective land ownership and institutional disfugurement,there have arisen many problems.Therefore some people,for the improvement of agricultural development and for the protection of farmers' benefits,have suggested a radical reformation of present-day rural land system: either a complete state-ownership or a complete private-ownership to substitute the rural collective-ownership.This kind of reformation surely concerns benefits of farmers,the central government,local governments and rural power classes.The institutional disfigurement has badly affected farmers' benefits but has well benefited other social groups.However the policy making government and the power classes,in their profit games,will not reform the present rural land collective-ownership.
Keywords:institutional disfigurement  profit games  rural land  collective-ownership
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