国有商业银行贷款风险控制滞后的原因

基于委托-代理理论构建一个分支行博弈模型,分析国有商业银行对贷款风险控制滞后的原因。研究认为,对基层代理人激励机制不足、代理人报酬体系缺乏风险揭示的激励、约束机制过于僵化、行长任期不确定等是导致国有商业银行基层代理人缺乏对贷款风险控制的动机的原因。

Reasons for risk control lagging in loaning from state-owned commercial banks

On the basis of agency-by-mandate theory,the paper sets utp a game model for a branch bank and analysizes the reasons for risk control lagging in loaning from the state-owned commercial banks.The research shows that the deficiency for the stimulating mechanism of grass-root agents,the lack of income system of the agents that way reveal the risks,the rigidness of the restricting mechanism and the uncertainty of the posifion of banks are the main reasons that may lead to the low spirit of risk control motivation of the grass-root agents in state-owned commericl banks.