违约风险、房地产贷款市场博弈与房地产价格

本文从事后激励的角度，构建了一个关于房地产个人贷款违约与银行反应策略的博弈模型，对中国房地产价格下跌的诱发机制以及家庭和银行的最优决策进行了理论分析。在此基础上选择35个大中城市作为研究样本，利用面板数据回归模型对相关理论推论进行了实证检验。理论推演和实证研究表明，家庭收入下降和房地产贷款违约是诱发房地产价格下跌的关键因素。提高购房首付比，降低房地产贷款价值比以及保持房地产贷款市场结构的适度集中，既可以抑制房地产价格过快上涨，也可以预防房地产价格发生暴跌风险。当房地产贷款出现违约时，为了避免房地产价格进入下降螺旋，银行的最优策略不是取消房地产抵押品的赎回权，而是采取积极的信贷刺激措施以稳住房地产价格。贷款市场份额占比越高的银行越有激励这样做。

Default Risk,Competition in Real Estate Credit Market and Real Estate Price

From the perspective of ex post incentives, this paper constructs a bank reaction strategy model on the default of real estate mortgage loans, analyzes the inducing factors leading to the decline of real estate prices in China and the optimal decisions of households and banks. I empirically test the theoretical inferences using the panel data of 35 medium-sized and large cities. The results show that family income decline and real estate credit default are the key factors to induce real estate prices to fall. Improving the down-payment ratio of house purchase, reducing the ratio of loan to value and maintaining a moderate concentration of the credit market can not only restrain the excessive rise of real estate prices, but also prevent the collapse of real estate price. When real estate credit default occurs, the bank's best strategy is not to cancel the foreclosure of real estate mortgages, but to take positive credit incentives to stabilize the real estate price. This will avoid the downward spiral of real estate prices. Banks with high credit market shares are more willing to do so.