基于不公平厌恶或地位追求的创新顾客最优合同类型研究

本文首先从创新顾客的公平偏好程度、薪酬合同类型（最优激励系数）与激励机制效果的关系入手，引入公平偏好理论（不公平厌恶和地位追求）、相对绩效评估（RPE）和参与成本要素，构建顾客参与企业新产品开发的激励模型；其次，通过模型求解和分析，探讨分析各类薪酬合同中风险成本、不公平预期损失和激励效果之间的关系；最后，通过仿真实验验证并确定企业采用的创新顾客最优薪酬合同类型。研究发现：在同一薪酬合同下，创新顾客愈不在意其参与成本的投入，该合同的激励效果愈积极；关于创新顾客最优合同类型的选择，意味着求解一个三方面权衡，包括风险成本、不公平预期损失和公平偏好的激励效果；对于公平偏好程度较低的创新顾客，企业可采用相对绩效合同，例如锦标竞争合同；对于公平偏好程度较高的创新顾客，当其风险规避程度较高时，可采用团队报酬合同，当其风险规避程度较低时，可采用完美团队合同。

A Research of the Optimal Contract Types of Innovative Customers Based on Inequity Aversion or Status Seeking

In today's rapidly changing and highly competitive business environment, it becomes more and more important for firms promoting product and service by gaining and using external knowledge from customers. The customers' participation in product and service innovation is increasingly emphasized both in theory and practice. Therefore, it is necessary to highlight the perception of equity in customer participation (CP) process and develop incentive measures specifically applied to this special group.However, most of the existing literatures research CP incentive measures in equilibrium condition where the degree of jealous equity preference is equal to the degree of sympathetic equity preference. In order to get close to reality, we should further consider the general situation andintroduce both inequity aversion theory and status seeking theory into this paper.Based on the above discussion, an incentive model of customer participation is built based on equity preference theory (inequity aversion and status seeking), relative performance evaluation and participation cost element from the perspective of innovative customers' participation in team innovation activities. First of all, the effect of the equity preference, incentive intensity and participation cost element on the incentive effect in all kinds of compensation contracts (independent compensation contract, relative performance contract, team compensation contract and perfect team compensation contract) is explored through the model solution and analysis. Secondly, the functional relationship among the risk cost, expected loss from inequity and incentive effect, and obtains the range of optimal incentive intensity andoptimal contract types for innovative customers is discovered. Thirdly, to examine the proposed models, the survey data of 265 users involved in a large software frim's product enhancement project in Guangzhou from March 1st to August 31st in 2017 are collected, which are adopted to carry on the analysis by using Mathematica. Finally, the corresponding management recommendations are put forward according to the research findings.The results show that:(1) Under the same compensation contract, if innovative customers pay more attention to the input of their effort costs, the more negative effect of the contract will be caused. (2) For innovative customers with a low degree of equity preference, frims can adopt relative performance contracts, such as competitive contracts; (3) For innovative customers with a high degree of equity preference, when their risk aversion degree is high, team compensation contracts can be adopted, and perfect team compensation contract can be adopted when their risk aversion degree is low.The main innovation points of this paper include-firstly, introduce both inequity aversion and status seeking into the design of CP incentives mechanism can not only further research the influence of equity preference on the optimal contract type of innovative customers and deepen the cognition of innovative customer incentive mechanism theoretically, but also provide the theoretical guidance which has more extensively applicable scope for firms to optimize innovative customer management.Secondly, it can further describe the influence of the participation cost of innovative customers on the incentive mechanism and enrich the connotation of innovative customer incentive theory that consider the actual situation of CP and introduce participation cost element into the model.