首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

基于资金约束的风险厌恶制造商融资策略和渠道选择研究
引用本文:曹宗宏,张成堂,赵菊,闵杰.基于资金约束的风险厌恶制造商融资策略和渠道选择研究[J].中国管理科学,2019,27(6):30-40.
作者姓名:曹宗宏  张成堂  赵菊  闵杰
作者单位:1. 安徽建筑大学数理学院, 安徽 合肥 230601;2. 安徽农业大学理学院, 安徽 合肥 230036;3. 合肥工业大学管理学院, 安徽 合肥 230009
基金项目:教育部人文社科基金资助项目(16YJA630003,16YJC630164);安徽省自然科学基金资助项目(1908085MG228,1808085MG215);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571002,71771003,71371075)
摘    要:针对风险厌恶制造商和零售商组成的供应链系统,考虑制造商因开通直销渠道面临资金约束、直销渠道需求不确定性和零售渠道增值服务,基于Stackelberg博弈理论构建了零售商提前支付模型和银行借贷模型,给出了制造商的最优融资策略和渠道选择策略。研究发现,提前支付对资金约束制造商总是最优的,但是只有当自有资金较少时零售商才愿意提前支付。对制造商来说,只有自有资金很少且风险厌恶程度较高时,才不开通直销渠道;零售商应该提高增值服务效率,并在一定条件下,中等的提前支付利率水平对零售商是最优的。最后,数值算例验证了结论的正确性。

关 键 词:资金约束  风险厌恶  提前支付  银行借贷  增值服务  
收稿时间:2017-08-15
修稿时间:2018-04-17

Channel Selection and Financing Strategy with a Risk-averse Manufacturer under the Capital Constraint
CAO Zong-hong,ZHANG Cheng-tang,ZHAO Ju,MIN Jie.Channel Selection and Financing Strategy with a Risk-averse Manufacturer under the Capital Constraint[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2019,27(6):30-40.
Authors:CAO Zong-hong  ZHANG Cheng-tang  ZHAO Ju  MIN Jie
Institution:1. School of Mathematics, Anhui Jianzhu University, Hefei 230601, China;2. School of Science, Anhui Agricultural University, Hefei 230036, Chian;3. School of Management, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, Chian
Abstract:With the rapid development of e-commerce, many manufacturers have opened their direct channels besides traditional retail channels. When a direct channel is established, opportunities and threats coexist. From the manufacturer's perspectives, running a direct channel cannot only directly improve the profitability, but also enhance the bargaining power with retailers. However, as an emerging sale channel, the demand in the direct channel may be instability and unreliability. Thus, the manufacturer needs to consider the risk arising from the uncertainty of running a direct channel. Moreover, capital constraint is a common phenomenon in the manufacturer's operation due to a direct channel developed. In addition, the presence of the direct channel may intensify the competition between manufactures and retailers, sometimes deteriorating retailers. This may result in retailers' counterattack, including the improvement of service level etc..Based on the practical background, our research issues are examined:First, how does a risk-averse manufacturer choose the proper financing ways under the advance payment financing with price discount and bank loan financing; Second, whether or under what conditions should a manufacturer choose to run a direct channel; Third, how the manufacturer's financing strategy and channel selection is affected by the manufacturer's risk aversion and the retailer's add-value service. To answer the above questions, a supply chain consisting of a risk-averse manufacturer and one retailer is considered. The manufacturer is capital constrained. Under a manufacturer-Stackelberg game, by formulating the problem as a mean-variance optimization problem and based on the uncertainty of developing a direct channel and add-value services of a retail channel, the advance payment model and the bank loan model are constructed to dispose the manufacturer's optimal financing strategies and channel choice strategies.Through the analysis of the model, the advance payment is optimal for the capital constrained manufacturer. The retailer is willing to pat in advance when the initial capital is very small. The manufacturer runs the direct channel only when the initial capital is very small and the risk aversion coefficient is large. The retailer should improve the efficiency of the add-value services, and should choose the medium rate of the advance payment to prevent running the direct channel. A numerical example is provided to illustrate the analytical results.
Keywords:capital constraint  risk aversion  prepayment  bank loan  add-value services  
点击此处可从《中国管理科学》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《中国管理科学》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号