基于知识创造和知识溢出的R&D联盟的动态模型

本文通过对R&D联盟中企业间知识创造和知识溢出的分析,给出了知识存量的一般表示方法,并将参与企业的知识投入和开放水平视为内生变量,构造了知识联盟R&D两阶段的非合作动态博弈模型,提出了在对称的情况下纳什均衡存在并有唯一解的条件,分析了知识投入和知识开放水平在联盟不同时期对企业均衡利润的影响,并通过案例对部分命题提供佐证。最后,在模型假设和模型思想方面进行了一些简单探讨。

A Dynamic Model of R&D Alliance Based on Knowledge Creation and Knowledge Spillover

In the past twenty years,establishing the technical alliance between competitive enterprises for R&D cooperation has been a hot topic in the industry economics literature.Knowledge alliance is an advanced technical alliance in which an enterprise cooperates with other enterprises,universities,or research institutes via all kinds of contracts or agreements.The success of knowledge alliance can enable business partners to share knowledge resources,learn about mutual interests,create new knowledge to complement advantages,and reduce risks.According to knowledge management theory,knowledge creation and knowledge spillover are regarded as the centralized embodiment of knowledge activities throughout the whole life cycle of a technical alliance. Management scholars have studied extensively on knowledge management in technical alliances.Qualitative and empirical studies primarily focus on learning processes,knowledge transferring modes and influential factors.The game theory or optimization theory uses mathematical models to analyze the effect of knowledge acquisition cost on enterprise profits and other social utilities.However,most analyses based on the mathematical model are static and do not consider the dynamics of alliance management.A few studies of this kind simultaneously consider both knowledge creation and spillover. The paper considers both knowledge creation and spillover,and threats the knowledge alliance evolution as a stage of a dynamic game.Enterprises participate in a non-cooperation game in each stage.Storing knowledge includes four parts:current knowledge input,previous knowledge storage knowledge absorption from other business partners,and new knowledge creation via technical alliances.Therefore,an alliance enterprise acquire knowledge from four aspects:an alliance’s creation ability,an enterprise’s absorption,each enterprise’s knowledge input,and business partners’ transparency level.In order to analyze the relationship among these four aspects,we define and construct functions to understand absorptive capacity,creation capacity and cost reduction via knowledge transformation.Two enterprises are involved in a non-cooperative feedback game with limited flexibility.We operate recursively to solve saddle points through the static model at each period and suggest conditions for the existence and the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in symmetry. The results show that when an enterprise’s knowledge storage is very small R&D input and transparency level have a similar effect on the profit.R&D input and transparency level play important roles in knowledge creation.In contrast,when the knowledge storage is small spillover effect is not obvious.This finding indicates that enterprise should choose a higher transparency level at the beginning of an alliance.However,when an enterprise’s knowledge storage is big R&D input and transparency level have the opposite effect on the profit.Knowledge spillover is more obvious than knowledge creation when an enterprise has strong absorption ability.This means that if an enterprise needs large knowledge inputs at the end of an alliance it should choose low transparency level,and vice versa.With the development of alliance and knowledge storage accumulation,the creation effect becomes inferior and the spillover effect becomes superior.If the knowledge input of an enterprise is invariant in every period,the level of transparency will become lower;identically.If the transparency level is invariant in every period,the knowledge input of enterprise will become smaller in the end.In addition,our findings offer an explanation for alliance failures when there is a large difference in knowledge transformation ability between business partners. The research improves the dynamic game about optimal knowledge input in the field of knowledge management in a technical alliance.The assumptions made in this model do not consider different R&D cooperation patterns,uncertainty and the end-time.This study has not analyzed deeply about the microscopic mechanism of knowledge creation and spillover in an alliance.Other theories such as TCE(Transaction Cost Economics),TIM(Total Innovation Management)et al,can be used to improve the findings of this study.