风险规避型供应链的收益共享机制研究

探讨了由风险规避型零售商与风险规避型供应商组成的两级供应链协作激励问题.首先研究了Stackelberg主从对策模型下风险规避型零售商与风险规避型供应商的决策行为,并分析了双方的风险规避系数对双方决策行为的影响.然后,研究了垂直一体化模型下风险规避型供应链的决策行为,同样分析了双方风险规避系数对供应链决策行为的影响程度.最后,提出采用收益共享契约机制来协调该供应链.并通过数值实验进一步分析供应商与零售商的风险规避系数对双方的决策行为及收益共享系数的影响程度.

Revenue Sharing Contract Mechanisms of Risk-Averse Supply Chains

Market demand uncertainty brings risks to supply chain members.All members have different risk preferences.For example,risk-averse members tend to choose conservative decision-making behaviors.In contrast,risk-taking members seek high risks and returns.Therefore,the design of supply chain coordination mechanisms should take the risk attitudes of supply chain members into consideration. The risk-averse decision maker behaves conservatively to mitigate risks in certain ways.If a supply chain contains risk-averse firm(s),we consider it as a risk-averse supply chain.Recently,studies on supply chain coordination and optimization with risk-averse decision makers have attracted extensive attentions.However,most existing models of this setting only consider single risk-averse supply chain member.Very few studies take both risk-averse suppliers and retailers into account.This study focuses on the supply chain coordination problem by considering both supplier and retailer are risk aversion decision-makers.Another objective of this study is to provide an in-depth analysis on how risk sensitivity affects the optimal decision-making behavior,and how these dynamics are altered by the coordination contract mechanism. Under the mean-variance value function,we investigate decision-making behaviors using the Stackelberg game model to analyze the behavior of risk-averse retailers and risk-averse suppliers,and the impact of risk-aversion coefficient on both sides of decision.Then,under the vertical integration model we study the risk-averse supply chain’s decision behavior and analyze the impact of both risk-aversion coefficients on the optimal decision-making behavior.By comparing the analysis of Stackelberg and vertical integration model,the results show that the risk-averse supply chain collaboration enhances the overall effectiveness.This finding suggests revenue sharing mechanisms be used to coordinate the supply chain. In addition,there are three major findings based on the numerical results.The first finding is that if a retailer is a risk-averse decision maker,the retailer will choose lower retail price to sell products in order to avoid income risk.At the same time,the retailer’s supplier will raise wholesale prices in order to obtain more revenue while the lower retail price can increase demand.The second finding is that if a supplier is a risk-averse decision maker,the supplier will reduce wholesale price in order to attract more orders from its retailers to reduce income risk.Because of lower wholesale price,the retailer can set up a lower equilibrium retail price to increase product sales,and expect more revenue.The third finding is that the range of revenue sharing coefficient will decrease with the decrease of the risk-aversion behavior of a retailer or a supplier.This means that as a retailer or supplier is more risk-averse,the utility difference for supply chain between co-operation and decentralized decision will be smaller.The fourth finding is that revenue sharing is widely regarded as a supply chain coordination mechanism to share risk and revenue in the structuring of supply chain.Revenue sharing mechanism can help achieve the risk-averse supply chain perfect coordination.However,the distribution of surplus profit under coordination depends on the bargaining power of both sides.