农村选举中的资源竞争与制度供给

当前一些地区的村委会选举中发生各种违规行为,甚至出现严重的暴力冲突事件。要分析其中的关键因素,可以从建立理论框架着手,依据共有资源竞争与制度供给相关理论,结合我国农村地区在取消农业税之后的治理结构现状,对村集体资源的竞争在何种情况下可能出现"失序",并进而导致暴力和冲突的发生进行分析。集体资源的收益大小会显著影响选举冲突的发生及其激烈程度;但其背后的关键作用机制,则是制度供给不足导致的基层治理能力弱化。要改变这种状况,除了需要鼓励乡镇一级基层政府更多地承担监管责任外,也应加强村庄内部的决策参与机制建设。

The Institutional Supply and Resources Competition in Rural Election of China

There were some illegal behavior and violent conflict in rural election of China.This study wanted to know what the critical factor is and how to resolve that.For this purpose,this study develop a simple frame which come from common-pool resources competition and institutional supply theories to predict the effects of rural collective resources and upper governance structure on the election conflict.Using a data set and some cases form field survey,this paper point out that,since agricultural tax was rescinded,the upper governments,such as town or country governments,whose political capacity to supply rural governance institution were weaken,in other words,they "quit" rural govern structure,leaving rural elites compete for the community common resources without regulatory system.Consequently,the probability and degree of conflict in rural election were significantly associated with the amount of rural collective common resources.The weakening of local governance capacity could be the root causes of conflict in rural election.As a result,if we want to change this situation,the local county township governments should be impelled to be more accountable towards rural governance.In addition,it is necessary to strengthen rural decision-making participation system mechanism.