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建设监理人员的寻租行为分析
引用本文:郑勇强,李海英,李一智.建设监理人员的寻租行为分析[J].中南大学学报(社会科学版),2005,11(5):646-649.
作者姓名:郑勇强  李海英  李一智
作者单位:1. 中南大学土木建筑学院,湖南,长沙,410075
2. 中南大学商学院,湖南,长沙,410083
摘    要:当前我国工程建设监理工作的范围主要限于施工阶段,造成这一现状的原因主要有两方面.一是业主的权益得不到保障使得业主不愿意委托监理;另一方面由于监理人寻租的空间很大,监理人信用度低.个人的行为总是以追求自身效益最大化为目标,因此,要改变当前现状的制度安排,即建立监理行业自我完善机制和第三方担保制度.

关 键 词:建设监理  寻租  信息不对称  博弈论  制度安排
文章编号:1672-3104(2005)05-0646-04
修稿时间:2005年3月4日

Rent-seeking analysis of construction supervisor
ZHENG Yong-qiang,LI hai-ying,LI Yi-zhi.Rent-seeking analysis of construction supervisor[J].Journal of Central South Huiversity: Social Science,2005,11(5):646-649.
Authors:ZHENG Yong-qiang  LI hai-ying  LI Yi-zhi
Abstract:The activities scope of construction supervision in our country is confined to the construction phase at present.The situation is brought about by two reasons. That is,the rights and interests of the project proprietor can not be ensured so that he is not willing to entrust the construction supervision.On the other hand,the supervisor's credit is flimsy because of his great possibility of rent-seeking.The motive of man's action is always to make his profit maximal.The expectation profits of settlor and trustee have been analyzed and the institution arrangement has been suggested to change the present situation in this paper.That is to establish the self-improvement mechanism of construction supervision and the third party security institution.
Keywords:construction supervision  rent-seeking  asymmetric information  game theory  institution arrangement  
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