Strategy-proofness and the reluctance to make large lies: the case of weak orders |
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Authors: | Shin Sato |
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Institution: | 1. Faculty of Economics, Fukuoka University, 8-19-1 Nanakuma, Jonan-ku, Fukuoka, 814-0180, Japan
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Abstract: | This article incorporates agents’ reluctance to make a large lie into an analysis. A social choice rule is D(k)-proof if the rule is nonmanipulable by false preferences within k distance from the sincere one, where k is a positive integer. If D(k)-proofness is not logically equivalent to strategy-proofness, then agents’ reluctance to make a large lie embodied in D(k)-proofness is effective to construct a nonmanipulable rule. This article considers weak orders as agents’ preferences. I prove that on the universal domain, D(k)-proofness is equivalent to strategy-proofness if and only if k ≥ m ? 1, where m is the number of alternatives. Moreover, I find a sufficient condition on a domain for the equivalence of D(1)-proofness and strategy-proofness. |
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