演化博弈视角下地方环境规制部门执法策略研究

通过建立环境规制中地方规制部门与排污企业的演化博弈模型,研究了博弈双方的决策演化规律,着重分析了地方规制部门环境执法的影响因素,并采用结构方程模型对理论分析结果进行了实证检验。研究结果表明:地方规制部门与排污企业的决策演化规律一共包含12种情形,对方策略既定条件下治污和执法策略的相对净支付决定了博弈主体策略选择。加大中央(上级)环保部门对地方规制部门的奖惩力度、提高环境规制标准,能够促使地方规制部门提高环境执法力度,而且加大奖惩力度的促进作用要大于提高环境规制标准。对环境执法产生负面影响的主要因素是地方政府干扰,其次是环境执法成本。污染削减技术创新既可能提高、也可能降低环境执法力度,实证结果表明其降低了环境执法力度。企业污染物产生量越大,地方规制部门越倾向提高环境执法力度。地方规制部门的环境执法特征是现有政治、经济和环保体制下多方互动的均衡结果。

Research on implementation strategy of the local environmental regulation department under the perspective of evolutionary game

The environmental regulation policy and standard are implemented by local environmental regulation departments in China,whether the pollution problems can be solved depending on the environmental regulation implementing the effect of the local environmental regulation department to a large extent.Existing research does not take local environmental regulation department as the executor of environmental regulation,and the research method is also limited to theoretical analysis,which is a lack of empirical test and impact assessment.This paper established an evolutionary game model to study the strategic law of the local environmental regulation department and enterprise.The influencing factors of local environmental regulation implementation are mainly analyzed,and the theoretical analysis results are also tested through investigating and establishing a structural equation model.The research hopes to provide a scientific basis for intensifying local environmental regulation implementation and improving environmental governance effect.In the first part,the influencing factors of local environmental regulation implementation are theoretically analyzed.The research takes the environmental regulation department group,and enterprise group in the local administration area as study object establishes an evolutionary game model of the local environmental regulation department and enterprise and stimulates the game process by replicator dynamics.The results show that there are 12 situations of strategic law in the game between local environmental regulation department and enterprise,and the strategic choices are determined by the relative net payoff of pollution control and implementation in the condition of certain opposite strategies.The strategic choices of game participants will be changed by influencing factors through changing relative net payoff of pollution control and implementation.In the second part,the influencing factors of local environmental regulation implementation are empirically tested.The questionnaire of the local environmental regulation department and enterprise is designed based on the observed variables.We choose prefecture cities in Liaoning province as investigating site which includes S,D,A,J,and P.After the data is tested on reliability and validity,the theoretical analysis results are empirically tested through establishing a structural equation model.In summary,the intensity of environmental regulation implementation will be enhanced both by increasing reward and punishment on the local environmental regulation department and increasing environmental standards.The effect of increasing reward and punishment is greater than increasing environmental standards.The intensity of environmental regulation implementation will be reduced both by the local government interference and regulation implementation cost,and the effect of interference is greater than the regulation implementation cost.The impact on the intensity of environmental regulation implementation from pollution reduction technology is ambiguous,but the empirical results show that the intensity of environmental regulation implementation is reduced by pollution reduction technology.The local environmental regulation department tends to implement environmental regulation strictly on the enterprise,which has large pollutant output.The character of environmental regulation implementation is the equilibrium result of interactivity under existing political,economic,and environmental protection systems.Both local environmental regulation implementation and its effect will be enhanced through improving the reward and punishment mechanism,reducing interference of local government and reducing environmental regulation implementation cost.