首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

基于收益共享契约的网络零售联合促销策略研究
引用本文:姜璇,程相惠,李沿海. 基于收益共享契约的网络零售联合促销策略研究[J]. 管理工程学报, 2020, 0(3): 122-133
作者姓名:姜璇  程相惠  李沿海
作者单位:中南财经政法大学工商管理学院;中南财经政法大学运营管理与系统工程研究所;暨南大学管理学院
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71602189,71672192);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(2722019PY011)。
摘    要:网络零售业造节促销已成常态,优化网络零售平台(简称平台商)和销售商联合促销策略是一项值得深入研究的课题。本文基于收益共享契约,利用不同的博弈模型刻画入驻销售商和平台商之间三种不同的促销模式,包括由其中一方率先发起促销的模式和二者同时发起促销的模式,研究不同模式下销售商和平台商的最优促销策略。研究结论表明,在三种促销模式下,二者的最优促销策略均随着商品佣金费率的增长依次呈现三种不同的形式:从仅由销售商提供促销到联合促销再到仅由平台商提供促销。当且仅当佣金费率和商品的日常售价高于一定阈值时,销售商和平台商才会有动机开展联合促销。研究还发现,销售商和平台商在各自率先发起的联合促销模式下具备先动优势。销售商(平台商)率先发起的联合促销将更有利于对佣金费率较低(高)的商品实施。当销售商和平台商同时独立发起促销时,供应链整体促销力度最大,供应链的整体利润也最高。

关 键 词:网络零售  促销  收益共享  最优策略

Optimal joint rebate strategy of online retail platform under revenue sharing contract
JIANG Xuan,CHENG Xianghui,LI Yanhai. Optimal joint rebate strategy of online retail platform under revenue sharing contract[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2020, 0(3): 122-133
Authors:JIANG Xuan  CHENG Xianghui  LI Yanhai
Affiliation:(School of Business Administration,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073,China;Institute of Operation Management and Systems Engineering,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073,China;School of Management,Jinan University,Guangzhou 510632,China)
Abstract:In recent years,it’s prevalent for the online retail platform(referred to platform hereafter)to hold large-scale sales promotion events.There are three types of sales promotion among all the promotional activities online.The first one is the platform that leads to initiate the promotion.The second is the seller that leads to initiate the promotion.The third is that no one leads the promotion,i.e.,the seller and the platform make decisions on promotional strategies independently as well as simultaneously.In each type of promotion,three strategies may appear,including only the seller offering a rebate,only the platform offering a rebate,or both of them offering a joint rebate.In each deal on the platform,the sellers always need to pay the commissions to the platform operator,which is a fix proportion of retail transactions.The commission rate is a long-term decision made by the platform after repeated practice in the operation,and different platforms or different products on the same platform may have different commission rates.This paper focuses on the instant rebate,which means the rebate set by the seller,and the platform is directly reduced from the original price of the product in each deal.This paper utilizes the revenue sharing contract to imitate the benefits relationship between the seller and the platform,where the only income of the platform is the commission provided by the seller.Nash game and Stackelberg games are used to model three different sales promotion types,and several specific case analyses are used to assist the verification.This paper addresses the following research problems:(1)What are the optimal promotion strategies for the seller and the platform?The unilateral promotion or the bilateral promotion(2)How do the parameters influence the optimal promotion strategies of the seller and the platform?(3)How do the different sales promotion types affect the promotion strength and the final profit in a joint rebate?(4)How to set optimal joint promotion strategies for different products,considering the characteristics of the platform?This paper shows that,under all the three different types of sales promotion,the optimal strategy of the seller and the platform varies from the seller-only rebate to joint rebate and finally to the platform-only rebate as the commission rate increasing.The joint rebate promotion exists only if the value of the commission rate as well as the normal price of the product is higher than a certain threshold.Moreover,the commission fee threshold of the top sellers is higher than that of the long-tail merchandise.When the seller and the platform initiate a joint rebate,the seller’s optimal promotion strength is decreasing in commission rate and increase in the original price of the product.Meanwhile,the platform’s optimal promotion strength is only related to the commission rate but not the original price of the product.This paper compares three different types of sales promotion and finds that the seller and the platform have the first-mover advantage when they lead to initiate the joint rebate promotion,where the leader can gain a higher profit with a lower optimal rebate value.The seller-leading(the platform-leading)promotion is more superior for stimulating joint promotion rebates on the products with the low(high)commission rates.Consumers will obtain the biggest rebate when the seller and the platform make promotion decisions simultaneously.Meanwhile,the supply chain also will achieve the highest profit compared with the other types of promotion.
Keywords:Online retail  Sales promotion  Revenue sharing  Optimal strategy
本文献已被 维普 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号