A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees |
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Authors: | Daniel J. Seidmann |
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Affiliation: | (1) School of Economics and CBESS, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom |
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Abstract: | We compare play in private and public committees when insiders care both about how well the committee decision serves organizational goals, and about the rewards which outsiders give for representing their interests. We show that a private committee reaches decisions which better serve organizational goals than either a public committee or the median insider choosing alone; and that a committee can only exhibit a norm of consensus if insiders vote in private. Finally, any insider who does not vote for a private committee’s decision must vote for a decision which better serves organizational goals; whereas a dissident in a public committee votes for a decision which worse serves organizational goals. |
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