| 上市公司虚假信息成本与收益分析——基于博弈论视角 |
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| 引用本文： | 凌艳平. 上市公司虚假信息成本与收益分析——基于博弈论视角[J]. 吉首大学学报(社会科学版), 2010, 31(4): 108-110 |
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| 作者姓名： | 凌艳平 |
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| 作者单位： | （湖南广播电视大学，湖南 长沙 410004） |
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| 基金项目： | 湖南省教育厅科学研究项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 上市公司虚假信息披露事件层出不穷，要从根本上找到解决虚假信息披露问题的方法，必须充分了解掌握这些利益主体的博弈过程，增加虚假信息披露的成本，降低虚假信息披露的收益，由此减少其披露虚假信息的博弈空间。
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| 关 键 词： | 上市公司虚假信息 成本 收益 博弈论 |
Analysis on Cost and Profit of False Information of Listed Companies: Based on the Game Theory Perspective |
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| LING Yan-ping. Analysis on Cost and Profit of False Information of Listed Companies: Based on the Game Theory Perspective[J]. Journal of Jishou University(Social Science), 2010, 31(4): 108-110 |
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| Authors: | LING Yan-ping |
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| Affiliation: | （Hunan Radio and Television University,Changsha,Hunan 410004,China） |
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| Abstract: | Listed companies disclose false information frequently.In order to find out the way to solve this problem fundamentally,it is necessary to understand well the game process among these interest subjects,to increase the cost of and reduce the profit from the false information disclosure,thus narrow the game space of false information disclosure. |
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| Keywords: | false information of listed companies cost profit the game theory |
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