Do ambiguity avoidance and the comparative ignorance hypothesis depend on people’s affective reactions? |
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Authors: | Enrico Rubaltelli Rino Rumiati Paul Slovic |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Developmental and Socialization Psychology, University of Padova, Via Venezia, 8, 35123 Padova, Italy;(2) Decision Research, 1201 Oak St. Suite 200, Eugene, OR 97401, USA;(3) Department of Psychology, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, USA |
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Abstract: | Previous work has showed that people are averse to ambiguity and prefer to bet on known probabilities over unknown probabilities.
There is also evidence that ambiguity aversion is stronger in comparative contexts rather than in non-comparative contexts.
In the present paper we suggest that ambiguity aversion depends on people’s affective reactions and therefore the effect is
more evident in comparative contexts because the comparison between the clear and ambiguous alternatives leads to more positive
affective reactions toward the former rather than the latter. The present study extends the previous findings while, at the
same time, supporting the “comparative ignorance hypothesis”. |
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