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地方官员经济行为效率缺乏的原因——一个来自激励理论的解说
引用本文:熊毅. 地方官员经济行为效率缺乏的原因——一个来自激励理论的解说[J]. 湛江师范学院学报, 2006, 27(5): 18-21
作者姓名:熊毅
作者单位:中南财经政法大学,经济系,湖北,武汉,430060
摘    要:在委托代理关系中,激励要有效必须具备一定条件,而在政治委托代理关系中,由于满足激励有效性的条件难以具备,使得委托人对官员的业绩很难考核准确,很难实行货币奖励,官员得不到货币奖励就会出现经济行为政治目的,导致激励考核有效性缺乏和激励奖励有效性缺乏。由此在我国经济中的具体表现就是地方官员经济行为有效性缺乏。

关 键 词:官员经济行为  激励条件  效率
文章编号:1006-4702(2006)05-0018-04
收稿时间:2006-08-05
修稿时间:2006-08-05

Local Officials'''' Lack of Efficiency in Economic Activities——An Explanation in the Incentive Theory
XIONG Yi. Local Officials'''' Lack of Efficiency in Economic Activities——An Explanation in the Incentive Theory[J]. Journal of Zhanjiang Normal College, 2006, 27(5): 18-21
Authors:XIONG Yi
Abstract:In the principal-agent relationship,incentive is effective under certain required conditions.But in the political principal-agent relationship,as it is difficult to evaluate officials' performance and reward them in material benefits,it would be easy for them to cultivate political objectives in economic activities,leading to the absence of efficiency in their evaluation and material incentives.One specific case is our local officials' lack of efficiency in their economic activities.
Keywords:officials' economic activities  incentive conditions  efficiency
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