政府推动下企业新技术采纳博弈分析

针对产品不同市场需求下企业采纳新技术的实际情况,尝试应用囚徒困境和多阶段序贯博弈思想建立存在政府补贴条件下企业新技术采纳战略决策模型,并对理性博弈方是否存在进化优势进行了分析。研究认为:①理性博弈方会尽早采用新技术,而市场对产品较高的需求增长会推迟企业采用新技术的时间;②理性博弈方要求政府补贴越少,产品市场需求增长率越高,政府为推动新技术采纳要支付的补贴也应相应增加;③较高的产品市场需求增长率和新技术采纳成本最终将理性企业逐出市场,而适当的政府补贴有利于理性企业生存。针对分析结论,提出可以有效推动新技术采纳的G-E框架模型。

The Game of Technology Adoption under Government-push

This paper discusses the technology adoption under government subsidies according to actual demand for production by Prisoner’s Dilemma game and sequential game and analysis whether or not the rational players have an evolutionary advantage.The results indicate: ① the more rational the competitors,new technology adopted in the earlier time and the higher demand for current technology will delay the technology adoption;② the more rational the player is the fewer subsidies from the government and the higher demand for current production,the more subsidies;③ the rational player will not have an evolutionary advantage,but if the subsidy from government is high enough,the rational player will have an evolutionary advantage.Then the G-E model is proposed to effectively push forward the technology adoption.