制销供应链安全责任的消费者驱动研究

从企业社会责任的一个方面--产品的安全性能对消费者偏好的影响入手,运用博弈论的基本思想,对消费者驱动的制销供应链安全责任决策进行了研究。结果表明:g类制销联盟较好地履行安全责任,能提高消费者对g类产品的支付意愿,从而获得较高的利润,这将对g类制销联盟进一步较好地履行安全责任产生激励驱动;若g类制销联盟未能较好地履行安全责任,消费者会用抵制购买(这种抵制行为会造成g类制销联盟的利润损失)的惩罚方式来驱动其较好地履行安全责任。g类制销联盟的最优决策是在控制成本的基础上较好地履行安全责任。本文的研究成果对供应链各成员的决策均有重要的指导意义。

Consumer-Driving Decision of Safety Responsibility of Manufacturer-Retailer Supply Chain

Starting from one perspective of the corporate social responsibilities-the product safety and its influence on the consumers,applying the basic idea of game theory,the essay studies consumer-driving de cision for safety responsibility of manufacturer-retailer supply chain.The results show that it can heighten consumer's pay desire to g product that gmanufacturer-retailer alliance fulfills safety responsibilities bet ter,thereby achieves higher profit.The situation will incentive gmanufacturer-retailer alliance to fulfill safety responsibilities better further.Consumer will drive gmanufacturer-retailer alliance to fulfill safety responsibilities better with punishing ways if gmanufacturer-retailer alliance fulfills safety responsibilities badly,the punishing ways comefrom consumer's boycott,which will make gmanufacturer-retailer alli ance a loss of profits.The perfect decision of gmanufacturer-retailer alliance is fulfilling safety responsibil ides better on the basis of controlling cost.The study will provide avaluable guidance to the decision of supply chain.