内省法与第一人称视角

自然化现象学的论题提出以来，认知科学或心灵哲学与现象学这两个所谓的对立阵营都开始积极地思考第三人称视角和第一人称视角之间对话的可能性。这需要首先澄清内省法的基本特征及背后的笛卡尔式“我思”概念，指出笛卡尔式二元论导致的对两个视角的错误划分。在此基础上，通过引入格式塔心理学思考非内省意义上的第一人称视角的可能性。

Introspection and First-Person Perspective

Since naturalizing phenomenology has been put forward, both cognitive science or philosophy of mind and phenomenology which seem to be opposite were starting to think of the dialogue between the third-per-son perspective and the first-person perspective. It is necessary to point out the wrong division of that two perspec-tives through the analysis of the characteristic of introspection and the concept of Cartesian“cogito”. On the basis of this, by introducing Gestalt theory, we will discuss the possibility of the non-introspective first-person perspec-tive.