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中小型建筑企业技术创新投资决策分析
引用本文:梅鹰,侯渡舟.中小型建筑企业技术创新投资决策分析[J].西安建筑科技大学学报(社会科学版),2007,26(4):77-80.
作者姓名:梅鹰  侯渡舟
作者单位:西安建筑科技大学,陕西,西安,710055
摘    要:创新是企业发展的源泉。对于我国现阶段的建筑业来说,要鼓励占市场绝大多数的中小型建筑企业进行技术创新。由于中小型建筑企业和大型建筑企业各自的创新策略不同,从而对技术创新的效用也不同,双方对技术创新投资时都本着自己效用最大化的原则,使二者在投资决策中相互博弈。通过一个静态博弈模型分析并试解释某些现实经济现象,并据此提出鼓励中小企业技术创新投资的措施。

关 键 词:中小建筑企业  技术创新  投资  博弈论
文章编号:1008-7192(2007)04-0077-04
修稿时间:2007年1月16日

Analysis on the Investment Decision of Medium and Minor Construction Enterprises in Technological Innovation
MEI Ying,HOU Du-zhou.Analysis on the Investment Decision of Medium and Minor Construction Enterprises in Technological Innovation[J].Journal of Xi'an University of Architecture & Technology(Social Science Edition),2007,26(4):77-80.
Authors:MEI Ying  HOU Du-zhou
Abstract:Innovation has been regarded as the source of enterprise development.As for the construction in- dustry in China,it is essential to encourage medium and minor construction enterprises,which have taken up the majority of construction market,to carry out technical innovation.Because of the different strategies in technological innovation,the medium and minor enterprises and large enterprises are different in their utility. They both invest in the technological innovation based on their maximized utility,so they game with each other in the process of making investment strategy.In this paper,a model of static game is presented and analyzed, and some actual economic phenomena are discussed.According to this,some measures are proposed to en- courage medium and minor construction enterprises to invest in technological innovation.
Keywords:medium and minor construction enterprises  technological innovation  investment  game theory
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