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创新厂商的技术许可策略研究
引用本文:郭红珍,郭瑞英.创新厂商的技术许可策略研究[J].华北电力大学学报(社会科学版),2007(2):36-40.
作者姓名:郭红珍  郭瑞英
作者单位:华北电力大学,工商管理学院,北京,102206;华北电力大学,工商管理学院,北京,102206
摘    要:基于差异Cournot双头垄断模型,主要研究创新厂商在两部制许可方式下的许可总得益与创新规模、产品替代率之间的关系,进而将其与提成许可、固定费用许可方式进行比较,最后确定创新厂商的最优许可策略。主要结论有:创新厂商在一定条件下偏好许可其各种规模的创新;产品替代率越高,创新厂商越偏好提成许可,反之越偏好固定费用许可;两部制许可介于固定费用与提成之间,只有在某个较窄的创新规模范围内,两部制许可才是最优策略。

关 键 词:博弈论  差异古诺模型  双头垄断  两部制许可
文章编号:1008-2603(2007)02-0036-05
修稿时间:2006年12月15

Technology Licensing Strategy of the Firm Innovator
GUO Hong-zhen,GUO Rui-ying.Technology Licensing Strategy of the Firm Innovator[J].Journal of North China Electric Power University(Social Sciences),2007(2):36-40.
Authors:GUO Hong-zhen  GUO Rui-ying
Abstract:Licensing by means of a fixed fee,a royalty or two-part tariff in a differentiated Cournot duopoly model is compared in this paper.It attempts to provide insights into the relation between licensing incentives of the innovator about three alternative licensing methods and the magnitude of the innovation,the degree of product differentiation.It proved that the patent-holding firm may license its drastic innovations when the goods are imperfect substitutes.Whether licensing method is superior for the licensor depends on comparisons between these three sources of income.It concludes that licensing by means of a royalty is superior to a fixed fee when the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently low,and two-part tariff is in-between.
Keywords:game theory  differentiated Cournot  duopoly  two-part tariff licensing
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