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非经营性政府投资项目特许经营期决策动态博弈模型
引用本文:王燕,唐文彬,钟姗姗.非经营性政府投资项目特许经营期决策动态博弈模型[J].吉首大学学报(社会科学版),2011,32(6):106-108.
作者姓名:王燕  唐文彬  钟姗姗
作者单位:(1.江苏大学 理学院,江苏 镇江 212000;2.长沙理工大学 经济与管理学院,湖南 长沙 410004;3.中南大学 土木建筑学院,湖南 长沙 410075)
基金项目:湖南省社科基金重点项目(2010ZDB30);湖南省社科基金一般项目(2010YBB043)
摘    要:在非经营性政府投资项目中引入特许经营可有效地实现项目投资主体多元化,从而解决项目资金短缺、投资主体缺位以及项目激励和约束机制失效等问题。通过构建无现金收益的非经营性政府投资项目实施过程中政府与项目公司之间的动态博弈模型,深入剖析了特许权期与项目公司建设成本、补偿费用等因素之间的相互影响,从而得出项目特许权期的决策方案,确定项目建设成本与补偿费用。算例分析结果表明非经营性政府投资项目的补偿费用对项目公司具有一定的激励效用。

关 键 词:非经营性政府项目  特许经营  动态博弈  特许权期  

The Dynamic Game Model of the Decisions of Non-Profitable Government Investment Project during its Concession Period
WANG Yan,TANG Wen-bin,ZHONG Shan-shan.The Dynamic Game Model of the Decisions of Non-Profitable Government Investment Project during its Concession Period[J].Journal of Jishou University(Social Science),2011,32(6):106-108.
Authors:WANG Yan  TANG Wen-bin  ZHONG Shan-shan
Institution:(Faculty of Science,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212000,China;School of Economy and Management,Changsha University of  Science and Technology,Changsha 410004,China;School of Civil Engineering and Architecture,Central South University,Changsha 410075,China)
Abstract:The non-profitable government investment projects can effectively invite diversified investors by introducing franchise and solve many questions such as the shortage of funds,the vacancy of the main investors,and the invalidation of the incentive mechanism.Through constructing a dynamic game model between government and the project company during the construction and operation of a non-profitable government investment project,the paper will analyze the mutual influence among concession period,construction c...
Keywords:non-profitable government investment Project  franchise  dynamic game  concession period  
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