| 考虑逆向选择与道德风险的保险契约研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 解百臣,王一舒,商利峰.考虑逆向选择与道德风险的保险契约研究[J].西南交通大学学报(社会科学版),2010,11(6):13-18. |
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| 作者姓名： | 解百臣 王一舒 商利峰 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金，教育部人文社会科学研究项目，中国博士后科学基金面上项目，教育部博士点青年教师基金，天津大学青年教师创新基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对非对称信息下保险市场的运行状态，将投保人分为高、中、低三种风险类型。据此，采用博弈模型分析逆向选择和道德风险约束下保险契约的订立问题，得到以下结论：道德风险与逆向选择行为的结果会相互叠加，市场行为监管政策的调整除了要加强理赔管理、信息披露制度建设外，对部分投保人蓄意骗保及大部分消费者维权意识不浓等情况同样需要予以关注。
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| 关 键 词： | 逆向选择 道德风险 非对称信息 保险市场 保险契约 |
Study of Insurance Contractor Considering Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard |
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| XIE Bai-chen,WANG Yi-shu,SHANG Li-feng.Study of Insurance Contractor Considering Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard[J].Journal of Southwest Jiaotong Universit(Social Science Edition),2010,11(6):13-18. |
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| Authors: | XIE Bai-chen WANG Yi-shu SHANG Li-feng |
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| Institution: | (School of Management, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China) |
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| Abstract: | To analyze the complex insurance market under asymmetric information, one model is forwarded, in which the risk types of the insured are labeled as high, medium and low. With adverse selection and moral hazard, the paper has studied several related factors leading to sign the contract. The results indicate that moral hazard and adverse selection can reinforce each other, and that the adjustment of marketing regulatory policy should pay attention to claim management and information disclosure system, and the consumers＇ fraud movements and rights awareness. |
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| Keywords: | adverse selection moral hazard asymmetric information insurance market insurance contract |
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