Quasi stable outcomes in the assignment game |
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Authors: | Raïssa-Juvette Samba Zitou Rhonya Adli |
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Institution: | 1.Department of Economic CREM,University of Caen,Caen, Cedex,France |
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Abstract: | There is a great deal of literature on matching, theoretical, and empirical, concerning stable assignments and mechanisms
that achieve them. The starting point of this study is an interesting question about assignment procedures: given a situation
where some agents (the senior workers) on one side have a priority status, which changes the classical theory. The core of
game may not be stable. We prove the existence of a quasi stable constrained core. This constrained core may not be a lattice
but it is a finite and disjoint union of complete lattices that check the properties of the core’s classical assignment game.
We study the manipulability questions that derive. |
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Keywords: | |
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