The Donation Paradox for Peremptory Challenges |
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Authors: | Kadane Joseph B Stone Christopher A Wallstrom Garrick |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Statistics, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, 15213 |
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Abstract: | A donation paradox occurs when a player gives an apparently valuable prerogative to another player, but does better , according to some criterion. Peremptory challenges, used in choosing a American jury, permit each side to veto a certain number of potential jurors. With even a very simple model of jury selection, it is shown that for one side to give a peremptory challenge to the other side may lead to a more favorable jury, an instance of the donation paradox. Both a theorem and examples are given concerning the existence of the donation paradox in the optimal use of peremptory challenges. |
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Keywords: | Backwards induction Candidate types Donation paradox Jury Power Sequential decision |
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