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基于税收博弈分析的公司制地方政府可行性探讨
引用本文:张辑,陈志强.基于税收博弈分析的公司制地方政府可行性探讨[J].燕山大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2004,5(4):57-61.
作者姓名:张辑  陈志强
作者单位:燕山大学经济管理学院,河北,秦皇岛,066004
摘    要:本文以扩展的古诺博弈模型为分析工具,假设地方政府是追求收益最大化的盈利性组织,通过对增值税和所得税税率的博弈分析,结合英国地方政府改制经验,从税率与税权制度安排的角度讨论了建立公司制地方政府的可行性及其意义。

关 键 词:古诺模型  税收博弈  基层地方政府公司化
文章编号:1009-2692(2004)04-0057-05
修稿时间:2004年6月20日

On the Feasibility of a Profit-making Local Government:a View from Game Theory of Tax-Revenue
ZHANG Ji,CHEN Zji-qiang School ofEconomics and Management,Yanshan University,Qinhuangdao,Hebei,China.On the Feasibility of a Profit-making Local Government:a View from Game Theory of Tax-Revenue[J].Journal of Yanshan University:Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition,2004,5(4):57-61.
Authors:ZHANG Ji  CHEN Zji-qiang School ofEconomics and Management  Yanshan University  Qinhuangdao  Hebei    China
Institution:ZHANG Ji,CHEN Zji-qiang School ofEconomics and Management,Yanshan University,Qinhuangdao,Hebei,066004,China
Abstract:With the political and economic reforms being deepened, it is compulsory for us to search for a newmodel of government management. In the assumption that local governmentsare profit-directed institutions engaged in earnings-maximization, this paper discusses the feasibility of establishing a corporate-like local government within the framework of the game theory of tax-revenue and analyses the system-arrangement of earnings tax and added value tax rate with reference of local government reform in other countries.
Keywords:Curnot model  revenue game  grass-roots local government
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