| 信号成本与服务外包供应商信号传递关系的博弈模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 梁建英,李垣,廖貅武.信号成本与服务外包供应商信号传递关系的博弈模型[J].中国管理科学,2007,15(1):99-105. |
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| 作者姓名： | 梁建英 李垣 廖貅武 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 西安交通大学管理学院, 陕西西安710049;
2. 河北经贸大学数学与统计学院, 河北石家庄050091 |
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| 摘 要： | 由于服务外包市场的信息不对称性和不完美性,外包商难以清楚了解供应商的能力,使得服务外包供应商选择市场出现逆向选择。为解决非对称信息条件下服务外包供应商选择市场运行的低效问题,本文利用信号博弈建立了信号成本与外包供应商信号传递关系的数学模型,并通过案例分析说明了该模型对管理的指导意义。
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| 关 键 词： | 非对称信息 逆向选择 信号博弈 供应商选择 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-207(2007)01-0099-07 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-4-21 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年4月21日 |
A Game Model on the Relations between Signal Cost and Outsourcing Vendor Signaling |
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| LIANG Jian-ying,LI Yuan,LIAO Xiu-wu.A Game Model on the Relations between Signal Cost and Outsourcing Vendor Signaling[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2007,15(1):99-105. |
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| Authors: | LIANG Jian-ying LI Yuan LIAO Xiu-wu |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Management, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049, China;
2. School of Mathematics and Statistics, Hebei Economy and Trade University, Shijiazhuang 050091, China |
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| Abstract: | Because of asymmetric information and imperfect information,it is difficult for outsourcer to clarify the ability of the vendor which usually results in adverse selection. To solve such a problem,a model for analyzing the impacts of asymmetric information on vendor selection is proposed. Furthermore,the condition for market success is given based on the signal cost of vendor and the belief of outsourcer in this paper. At last,a case analysis is presented to demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the model on management significance. |
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| Keywords: | asymmetric information adverse selection game vendor selection |
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