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假冒伪劣商品市场交易的博弈分析——兼论“打假”之对策
引用本文:吕文震,江可申.假冒伪劣商品市场交易的博弈分析——兼论“打假”之对策[J].南京航空航天大学学报(社会科学版),2006,8(1):50-54.
作者姓名:吕文震  江可申
作者单位:南京航空航天大学,经济与管理学院,江苏,南京,210016
摘    要:假冒伪劣商品存在的重要前提是信息不对称;它的关键特征就是它同信号传递、监管的不完善相伴而生。利用退款保证制度,可以避免商品交易中“逆向选择”现象的发生,提高市场效率,从而抑制假冒伪劣的发生和改善市场均衡的类型。“寻租行为”源于信号传递、监管的不完善,导致政府监督管理部门的失职;加强对相关管理部门的监督和失职行为的查处,有助于长期抑制假冒伪劣活动。

关 键 词:假冒伪劣商品  博弈  对策
文章编号:1671-2129(2006)01-0050-05
修稿时间:2005年8月25日

An Analysis of the Marketing of Fake and Inferior Commodity based on Game Theory
LV Wen-zhen,JIANG Ke-shen.An Analysis of the Marketing of Fake and Inferior Commodity based on Game Theory[J].Journal of Nanjing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics(Social Sciences),2006,8(1):50-54.
Authors:LV Wen-zhen  JIANG Ke-shen
Abstract:The asymmetrical information is the important premise of fake and shoddy merchandise;it is essentially characterized by its' coexistence with inferior transmission of signals and faultiness of supervising.Refund guarantee system can get rid of "the reversion choice" in commodity exchange and enhance market efficiency,thus controlling spurious activities and improving the type of market balance."Seeking behavior",resulting from the inferior transmission of signals and faultiness of supervision,causes the absence of the government supervision,which should be more severely punished in order to suppress the spurious activity in a long term.
Keywords:fake and shoddy commodity  game  countermeasures
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