不完全信息条件下收费公路利益相关者博弈均衡及对策

为掌握收费公路利益相关者的博弈策略,寻求具有较强针对性的治理对策,应用不完全信息静态博弈理论,分析了收费公路利益相关者的混合博弈策略及均衡问题。研究表明：收费公路利益相关者主要包括三大主体：政府、公路经营企业和通行者;政府监管不力、企业违规经营、通行者监督缺失,是三者博弈过程中的一个现实均衡解,亟待解决;收费公路治理机制应该从强化政府监管、加大对违规企业惩处力度、畅通通行者监管渠道、营造合规经营的文化氛围等方面展开。

Game equilibrium and countermeasures of toll road stakeholders under condition of incomplete information

In order to know well about the game strategies of toll road stakeholders and find bettertargeted countermeasures,this article uses the static game theory of incomplete information to analyze the mixed game strategies and equilibrium of toll road stakeholders.The study shows that toll road stakeholders mainly consist of three main parts,that is,the government,the highway operation enterprises and drivers.The regulatory inaction of the government,the violating operation of enterprises as well as the poor supervision on drivers are the equilibrium solution in reality in the game process among the three and these problems need to be solved urgently.The governance mechanism of toll road should target at strengthening government regulations,intensifying punishment of enterprises in violation of regulations,ensuring supervision on drivers and constructing cultural atmosphere for proper operations and so on.