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利益博弈视角下小产权房治理的反思
引用本文:刘毅,田琳琳,马永驰. 利益博弈视角下小产权房治理的反思[J]. 大连理工大学学报(社会科学版), 2011, 32(4): 107-111
作者姓名:刘毅  田琳琳  马永驰
作者单位:1. 大连理工大学公共管理与法学学院,辽宁大连,116024
2. 大连理工大学软件学院,辽宁大连,116020
基金项目:辽宁省社会科学基金一般项目,中国博士后科学基金
摘    要:小产权房治理中存在复杂的利益博弈关系,并由此导致了政策压力持续增加与小产权房快速扩张的悖论。考虑到动态治理成本,地方政府的实际偏好序列既不满足"理性经济人"假设,又难以符合政策预期,反而更倾向于通过合作的方式参与小产权房的利益分配。而对于利益相关者来说,遵守不会成为理性策略,他们只会在合作与冲突之间进行选择。小产权房治理中政策执行亏空的出现具有必然性,地方政府倾向于通过制度创新与制度仿效促进小产权房的合法化。

关 键 词:小产权房  偏好  博弈  合作

Reflections on the Treatment of Minor-Property-Right Houses in China: a Game Perspective
LIU Yi,TIAN Lin-lin,MA Yong-chi. Reflections on the Treatment of Minor-Property-Right Houses in China: a Game Perspective[J]. Journal of Dalian University of Technology(Social Sciences), 2011, 32(4): 107-111
Authors:LIU Yi  TIAN Lin-lin  MA Yong-chi
Affiliation:1.School of Public Administration and Law,Dalian University of Technology,Dalian 116024,China 2.School of Software,Dalian University of Technology,Dalian 116020,China
Abstract:There exists a complicated benefit game due to the dilemma between the increasing policy pressures and the rapid expanding minor-property-right houses.Taking dynamic governance cost into consideration,the local government is not a "rational economic man" and its preference orders do not adapt to policy expectations.The local governments are inclined to share the benefits of minor-property-house through cooperation.As for the stakeholders,they will choose between cooperation and conflict,taking no account of obedience.Policy implementation deficit is inevitable and local government will promote legalization of minor-property-right houses by institution innovation and imitation.
Keywords:minor-property-right house  preference  game  cooperation
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