期权属性、公司治理与可转债发行

我国可转债发行条款同质化,尤其较低的折股溢价、赎回强制转股,扭曲了发行人与投资者之间的风险与收益配置,动摇了资本市场对发行人的价值预期。本文从可转债的期权属性出发,研究公司治理与可转债发行动机之间的关系,并与可转债债务、股权属性的作用做了对比。实证研究发现,转股稀释率与"股东—管理层"之间的代理成本负相关,与"股东—债权人"之间的代理成本正相关,与"大股东—小股东"之间的代理成本无关,验证了我国上市公司发行可转债有利于治理投资不足、投资过度的两难问题;但民营企业可转债发行的治理动机有所不同。我国资本市场陷入了投资者积极认购可转债,发行人不愿采用可转债,可转债治理功能难以全面发挥的多重困境。降低可转债的全生命周期成本,优化可转债发行的转股条款和赎回条款,改革配售制度,是发挥可转债全面治理功能的重要前提。

Option,Corporate Governance and Convertible Bonds Issuance

When convertible bonds are issued by listed companies in China,the premium of converting bonds into common stocks is relatively small.Moreover,the redemption of convertible bonds by issuers will force the holders of convertible bonds to convert convertible bonds into stocks.The homogenization of these practices in the China’s capital market is more serious,so the convertible bond issuance terms of listed companies distort the allocation of risk or income between the issuers and the investors,and shake the capital market’s value expectations of issuers.This paper studies the relationship between corporate governance and the issuing motivation of convertible bonds from the perspective of the option attribute of convertible bonds,and makes comparisons with the other two functions of the debt and equity attribute of convertible bonds.This empirical study shows that the dilution ratio of the convertible bonds is negatively related to the agency cost between shareholders and management,positively related to the agency cost between shareholders and creditors,but irrelevant to the agency cost between large shareholders and small shareholders.This conclusion proves that the issuance of convertible bonds by Chinese listed companies is conducive to the governance of the dilemma of insufficient investment and excessive investment.However,compared with the state-owned companies,the governance motivation of convertible bond issuance of private enterprises is different.China’s capital market has formed multiple dilemmas,that is,investors are actively subscribing for convertible bonds,issuers are unwilling to use convertible bonds,and it is difficult to fully play the governance function of convertible bonds.Therefore,this paper believes that reducing the cost of the whole life cycle of convertible bonds,optimizing the terms of conversion and redemption of convertible bonds,and reforming the distribution system of convertible bonds are the important contents and can give full play to the comprehensive governance function of convertible bonds.