| 反基础主义与可误论:皮尔士认识论研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 潘磊.反基础主义与可误论:皮尔士认识论研究[J].学术研究,2011(10). |
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| 作者姓名： | 潘磊 |
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| 作者单位： | 武汉大学哲学学院 湖北武汉,430072 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对笛卡尔式的基础主义,皮尔士在认识论上提出了反基础主义和可误论的思想,认为并不存在享有认知特权的基础信念,所有信念都是可错的.尽管皮尔士在认识论上是一个反基础主义者,但他仍然持有温和基础主义的观点,并对基础信念(关于外部世界的经验信念)与经验之间的关系提供了一种实用主义的说明.
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| 关 键 词： | 皮尔士 反基础主义 可误论 温和基础主义 |
Mr.Peirce's Research of Epistemology as a Theory of Anti-Fundamentalism and Being Fallibilism |
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| Pan Lei.Mr.Peirce''s Research of Epistemology as a Theory of Anti-Fundamentalism and Being Fallibilism[J].Academic Research,2011(10). |
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| Authors: | Pan Lei |
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| Abstract: | Aiming at the Cartesian Fundamentalism,Peirce develops his anti-fundamentalism and fallibilism in epistemology,which hold that there are no such basic beliefs as having epistemic privilege and all beliefs are fallible.Although Peirce is an anti-fundamentalist in epistemology,he holds a modest fundamentalist view.Moreover,he provides a pragmatic explanation for the relationship between the basic beliefs,i.e.the empirical beliefs about the external world,and the human experience. |
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