基于经济博弈模型的酒类防伪问题研究

面对酒类行业制假问题的频发，品牌酒厂需要从经济本质探寻有效防伪的方法。采用混合策略博弈和不完全信息动态博弈的方法研究品牌酒厂、制假者和消费者之间的经济利益关系，解释了采取规模化防伪措施的必要性，提出防伪程度的界定标准，认为采取防伪行动利于减少信息的不对称。并进一步估算出在保证品牌酒厂收益最大的前提下，防伪投入成本的最优值，为品牌酒厂提供合理的方向指导，为监管部门提供政策建议。

Wine Anti-counterfeiting Issues Based on Economic Game Theory Model

In the face of the problems of frequent fraud in wine industry, brand wineries have taken anti-counter-feiting measures to cope with the economic and brand loss caused by adulterated wine. The economic relation-ships among the brand wineries, counterfeiters and consumers are analyzed in mixed strategy game and incom-plete information dynamic game theory to explain the necessity of taking anti-counterfeiting operations and to pro-pose the defined standards of anti-counterfeiting level. What’ s more, the related factors affecting consumer pur-chase are clarified, which is beneficial to reducing information asymmetry. Then, in the premise of ensuring the maximum earnings of the brand wineries, the optimal value of the anti-counterfeiting investment cost is estimated so as to provide reasonable guidance for brand wineries and policy recommendations for regulatory authorities to promote the establishment of a sound regulatory system and a whole virtuous circle for the wine market.