核威慑机理:实力基础、信号传递和心理博弈

基辛格提出了威慑分析框架,认为威慑需要实力、使用实力的意志以及潜在的进攻者对这两方面因素的综合评估等三方面因素的结合,但他没有对这一分析框架进行深入分析。本文跳出从战略稳定性角度分析核威慑的传统思路,把认知和心理因素植入核威慑分析之中,对基辛格建构的威慑分析框架进行了细化,并将其用于核威慑分析,把威慑的三个构成要素置换为核实力基础、核威慑信号传递和核威慑心理博弈三个变量,把核威慑界定为在核力量基础上通过信号传递进行的心理博弈。影响核武器数量规模的因素分为国家政策因素、确定一国核武器数量的直接依据、国家资源约束和国际环境的影响。核威慑信号传递包括口头信号传递、书面信号传递、捆绑信号传递和行动信号传递四种方式,每一种传递方式各有其传递路径。在核威慑心理博弈部分,分析了对核威慑正确认知的形成机制,并在此基础上分析了核力量平衡国家间的核威慑心理博弈、核力量悬殊国家间的核威慑心理博弈和导弹防御系统对核威慑心理博弈的影响。分析核威慑中核力量与使用核力量意志的关系、描述核威慑过程中信号传递的方式与路径和威慑与被威慑双方的心理博弈过程,对于分析核威慑有效性、维持大国间战略稳定性,具有一定的理论价值和现实意义。

The Mechanism of Nuclear Deterrence: Capabilities,Signaling and Psychological Game

While Kissinger proposed an analytical framework for deterrence analysis involving a combination of power,the will to use it,and a comprehensive assessment of these two factors by potential attackers,he did not conduct any in-depth analysis of this framework.This paper seeks to refine Kissinger’s framework by jettisoning the strategic stability centered approach and instead incorporating cognitive and psychological factors.Kissinger’s three elements of deterrence are replaced by three new variables:possession of nuclear weapons,sending out signals of deterrence,and psychological game of nuclear deterrence,thus redefining nuclear deterrence as a psychological game through signaling nuclear capabilities.The factors affecting the size of nuclear forces include national policies,the direct basis for determining the size country’s nuclear arsenal,national resource constraints,and the impact of the international environment.The signaling of nuclear deterrence can be approached in four ways:through oral or written communication,in bundled fashion,or through action.With respect to the psychological game of nuclear deterrence,this article analyzes the formation mechanism of the correct cognition of nuclear deterrence,the psychological game between nuclear-weapon states when there is parity as well as disparity,and the influence of missile defense system on the psychological game.It is of both theoretical and practical value for assessing the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence and for the maintenance of strategic stability between great powers to analyze the relationship between nuclear capabilities and the will to use nuclear weapons,identify the way nuclear deterrence is signaled,and elucidate the psychological game between both parties in the deterrence process.