Followers and leaders: Reciprocity,social norms and group behavior |
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Authors: | Raúl López-Pérez |
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Affiliation: | Departamento de Análisis Económico, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 28049 Madrid, Spain |
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Abstract: | This paper proposes a model of norm-driven preferences and studies the determinants of norm compliance in games. It predicts that (i) compliance follows a law of demand and (ii) people respect norms in a reciprocal manner: they are more likely to comply if others are expected to comply too. Reciprocal norm compliance might explain why successful revolutions or strikes grow in a snow-balled fashion, leaders motivate others to join social movements, or sequential mechanisms (instead of simultaneous ones) are usually employed in charity fundraising. |
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