公司治理应该关注盈余治理--基于委托代理理论的分析

分析了所有权和控制权分离后所引发的委托代理关系,并指出信息不对称和利益冲突是两个基本的委托代理问题.利益冲突和信息不对称的存在,为公司管理当局进行盈余管理提供了必然性和可能性,现实中我们可以找到很多直接的证据.作为解决委托代理问题的一种激励约束机制,公司治理的一个核心问题,是企业盈余,这表现在无论是信息不对称问题还是利益冲突问题,其焦点和核心都是企业盈余.基于上述分析,我们提出了盈余治理的概念,并强调对公司治理的研究,应该围绕盈余治理这一核心而展开.

Corporate Governance Should Focus on Earnings Governance-- An Analysis Based on Agency Theory

It is examined that the agency problem caused by the separation of ownership and control, and argued that Information Asymmetry and Interest Conflicts are two basic problems in agency relationship. These two problems provide the necessity and probability for firm management to manage earnings, and we find related evidence in realities. As a mechanism to deal with the agency problem, corporate governance should focus on earnings management. The reason is that different interest-parties in information asymmetry and interest conflicts pay their most important attentions on issue of earnings. Therefore we raise the concept of earnings governance, and believe that earnings governance is the core of corporate governance.