| Abstract: | By allowing voters to choose among candidates with competingpolicy orientations and by providing incentives for incumbentsto shape policy in the direction the public desires, electionsare thought to provide the foundation that links governmentpolicy to the preferences of the governed. In this article Iexamine the extent to which the preference/policy link is biasedtoward the preferences of high-income Americans. Using an originaldata set of almost two thousand survey questions on proposedpolicy changes between 1981 and 2002, I find a moderately strongrelationship between what the public wants and what the governmentdoes, albeit with a strong bias toward the status quo. But Ialso find that when Americans with different income levels differin their policy preferences, actual policy outcomes stronglyreflect the preferences of the most affluent but bear virtuallyno relationship to the preferences of poor or middle-incomeAmericans. The vast discrepancy I find in government responsivenessto citizens with different incomes stands in stark contrastto the ideal of political equality that Americans hold dear.Although perfect political equality is an unrealistic goal,representational biases of this magnitude call into questionthe very democratic character of our society. |
