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中国民间资本进入银行业:制度变迁路径选择的博弈分析
引用本文:吴凡.中国民间资本进入银行业:制度变迁路径选择的博弈分析[J].四川大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2006(5):77-83.
作者姓名:吴凡
作者单位:西南财经大学,四川成都 610074
摘    要:从博弈分析的角度来看,转型期中国民间资本进入银行业是多方博弈的结果,其制度变迁过程可以看成是国家与民间资本之间的博弈过程,变迁的路径就是博弈均衡解的轨迹。本文通过建立该制度变迁的动态匹配博弈模型,实证地分析这种制度是如何被博弈出来的,详细阐述该制度变迁的历史路径与路径特征,并提出相应政策建议。

关 键 词:中国民间资本  银行业  制度变迁路径  动态匹配博弈模型
文章编号:1006-0766(2006)05-0077-07
修稿时间:2006年2月12日

Chinese Private Capital Entering Domestic Banking: Game Research on Institutional Transition Route Selection
WU Fan.Chinese Private Capital Entering Domestic Banking: Game Research on Institutional Transition Route Selection[J].Journal of Sichuan University(Social Science Edition),2006(5):77-83.
Authors:WU Fan
Abstract:From the angle of game research,the institution of Chinese private capital entering domestic banking is the result of many factors,especially the game between government regulations and private capitals.The institutional transition route can be regarded as the track of equilibrium solutions of game.This paper first establishes the quantitative analysis model of "dynamic matching and bargaining game," then analyzes how this game got its result with cases and expounds details of its change's historical route and route characters.
Keywords:Chinese private capital  domestic banking  institutional transition route  dynamic matching game model
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