| Bertrand双寡头对上游供应商行为的演化博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 韩敬稳,赵道致,秦娟娟.Bertrand双寡头对上游供应商行为的演化博弈分析[J].管理科学,2009,22(2). |
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| 作者姓名： | 韩敬稳 赵道致 秦娟娟 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072;天津财经大学,理工学院,天津,300222
2. 天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对目前普遍存在的供应链上下游由于力量不对等而导致的强势一方向弱势一方转嫁成本的现状,研究力量不对等供应链上零售寡头对上游供应商的行为策略.建立竞争环境下的Bertrand寡头模型,得到双寡头采用不同行为策略的支付矩阵.在此基础上,应用演化博弈论中双种群演化模型进行分析,得到双寡头对上游供应商行为的演化稳定均衡.研究结果表明,由于零售寡头之间的竞争,随着寡头对供应商利益侵占数额的增大,双寡头对上游供应商的均衡策略依次为(转嫁成本,转嫁成本)、(转嫁成本,不转嫁成本)以及(转嫁成本,不转嫁成本)与(不转嫁成本,转嫁成本)共存的情况.同时进一步指出市场容量、寡头实力差距、侵占度等参数变化对演化稳定均衡的影响.
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| 关 键 词： | 力量不对等供应链 Bertrand寡头模型 双种群演化模型 演化稳定策略 |
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Bertrand Duopoly's Behavior to Their Upstream Suppliers |
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| HAN Jing-wen,ZHAO Dao-zhi,QIN Juan-juan.Evolutionary Game Analysis of Bertrand Duopoly's Behavior to Their Upstream Suppliers[J].Management Sciences in China,2009,22(2). |
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| Authors: | HAN Jing-wen ZHAO Dao-zhi QIN Juan-juan |
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| Institution: | HAN Jing-wen1,2,ZHAO Dao-zhi1,QIN Juan-juan1 1 School of Management,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China 2 Institute of Technology,Tianjin University of Finance , Economics,Tianjin 300222,China |
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| Abstract: | Targeting at the ubiquity of transferring cost from powerful member to weak one for their unbalanced bargaining power,we study the behavior of the retailer duopoly to their upstream supplier on supply chain with unbalanced bargaining power.We construct a Bertrand duopoly model with competition so as to obtain a payoff matrix of different behavior strategies.On this basis,using double groups' evolutionary model in evolutionary game theory we get the evolutionary stable strategies(ESS) of the duopoly's behavi... |
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| Keywords: | supply chain with unbalanced bargaining power Bertrand duopoly model double groups' evolutionary model evolutionary stable strategies |
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