| 国有商业银行信贷中的几个经济学问题 |
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| 引用本文： | 邹新月,刘婵,徐文汇. 国有商业银行信贷中的几个经济学问题[J]. 湖南科技大学学报(社会科学版), 2001, 3(2): 4-6 |
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| 作者姓名： | 邹新月 刘婵 徐文汇 |
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| 作者单位： | 湘潭工学院产业经济研究所, |
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| 摘 要： | 在信贷市场上，银行和企业分别扮演着委托人和代理人的角色，两者存在着信息不对称。重点探讨了信贷市场中由于信息不对称性而产生的道德风险、逆向选择、机制设计、寻租行为等经济学问题及其解决办法。
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| 关 键 词： | 道德风险；逆向选择；机制设计；寻租 |
| 文章编号： | 1009-5357(2001)02-0004-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2000-08-25 |
The concerning economics problems of state-owned commercial banks for credit market |
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| ZHOU Xin-yue,LIU Chan,XU Wen-hui. The concerning economics problems of state-owned commercial banks for credit market[J]. journal of hunan university of science&technology, 2001, 3(2): 4-6 |
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| Authors: | ZHOU Xin-yue LIU Chan XU Wen-hui |
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| Abstract: | On the credit market,the bank and enterprise play individually the roles of principal-agent,and there are asymmetric information for each other. Because of the asymmetric information, this paper studies emphatically economics problems such as moral hazard, adverse selection, mechanism design and seeding rent behavior etc in the credit market and the solution to them. |
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| Keywords: | moral hazard adverse selection mechanism design seeking rent |
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