Games,goals, and bounded rationality |
| |
Authors: | Leigh Tesfatsion |
| |
Affiliation: | (1) Dept. of Economics, University of Southern California, University Park, MC, USA;(2) 90089 Los Angeles, CA, USA |
| |
Abstract: | A generalization of the standard n-person game is presented, with flexible information requirements suitable for players constrained by certain types of bounded rationality. Strategies (complete contingency plans) are replaced by policies, i.e., endmean pairs of goals and controls (partial contingency plans), which results in naturally disconnected player choice sets. Well-known existence theorems for pure strategy Nash equilibrium and bargaining solutions are generalized to policy games by modifying connectedness (convexity) requirements. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|