Games,goals, and bounded rationality |
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Authors: | Leigh Tesfatsion |
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Affiliation: | (1) Dept. of Economics, University of Southern California, University Park, MC, USA;(2) 90089 Los Angeles, CA, USA |
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Abstract: | A generalization of the standard n-person game is presented, with flexible information requirements suitable for players constrained by certain types of bounded rationality. Strategies (complete contingency plans) are replaced by policies , i.e., endmean pairs of goals and controls (partial contingency plans), which results in naturally disconnected player choice sets. Well-known existence theorems for pure strategy Nash equilibrium and bargaining solutions are generalized to policy games by modifying connectedness (convexity) requirements. |
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Keywords: | |
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