参股银行、终极控制人与公司投资行为

研究上市公司参股银行对不同终极控制人的公司投资行为的影响,以揭示在股东—债权人代理冲突下,不同终极控制人的上市公司参股银行后在银行对其不同的外在约束下所产生的对公司投资行为的不同影响,并基于中国沪深股市2009—2012年间150家参股银行的公司共600个观测值的平衡面板数据进行了实证研究,研究结果表明:随着公司持股银行的比例增加,对银行业金融资源的控制能力增强,可以抑制公司的过度投资和投资不足行为,投资扭曲减少;终极控制权为中央或者地方政府的上市公司参股银行之后面临银行的软约束使其过度投资或投资不足现象更严重,而非中央或者地方政府的上市公司参股银行后其投资行为受到银行的硬约束,则可以有效抑制其过度投资和投资不足。研究结论为上市公司低效率投资现象提供了一种解释,同时也为监管部门设计约束政府干预公司经营行为的机制提供了一定的经验依据。

Holding Bank Shares,Ultimate Controller and Corporate Investment Behavior

This paper studied the relationship between holding bank shares and investment behavior of different ultimate controller of listed companies , in order to reveal the investment behavior of listed company's holding bank shares on different ultimate controller because of different budget constraint under the shareholder‐creditor agency conflict .T his paper made the empirical research by choosing 150 Chinese Stock Markets listed company's holding bank shares from 2009 to 2012 Studies have shown that :(1) with the proportion increase of holding bank shares , listed companies enhanced the control to financial resources , and curb excessive investment and insufficient investment ;(2 ) listed companies prior to excessive investment and insufficient investment on government ultimate controller because of soft budget constraint , but curb excessive investment and insufficient investment on non‐government ultimate controller because of hard budget constraint .