Another impossibility result for normal form games |
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Authors: | Quesada Antonio |
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Institution: | (1) Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Murcia, Campus de Espinardo, 30100 Espinardo, Murcia, Spain |
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Abstract: | It is shown that the axioms Cubitt and Sugden (1994; Economic J. 104: 798) impose on a theory of rationally justifiable play (TRJP) do not prevent the possibility that two players necessarily disagree concerning the probability they ascribe to the choice of a third player. This appears to indicate that those axioms are not sufficient for defining a `reasonable' TRJP. In addition, for the case in which a player's beliefs are statistically independent, conditions for a TRJP are suggested under which the existence of a quasi-strict equilibrium is sufficient, but the existence of a consistent n-pair is not, for defining a TRJP meeting those requirements. |
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Keywords: | Normal form game rationally justifiable play quasi-strict equilibrium consistent n-tuple |
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