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基于价值创造和动态基础薪酬的经营者激励机制研究
引用本文:孙世敏,王昂,贾建锋. 基于价值创造和动态基础薪酬的经营者激励机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2011, 19(5): 153-159
作者姓名:孙世敏  王昂  贾建锋
作者单位:东北大学工商管理学院, 辽宁 沈阳 110004
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072122,70902064); 中国博士后科学基金资助项目(20100471459)
摘    要:目前,经营者激励机制研究通常以净收益为业绩标准,采用固定基础薪酬制度,且大多数局限于薪酬激励。本文以价值创造为业绩标准,采用动态基础薪酬制度,将薪酬激励与非薪酬激励相结合设计经营者激励模型,在传统委托代理模型基础上得出如下三点结论:第一,实行动态基础薪酬制度可以有效提升经营者努力水平;第二,经营者激励应采用薪酬激励与非薪酬激励相结合的手段,并依据非薪酬激励敏感度灵活设计二者的组合比例;第三,垄断行业经营者努力水平低于竞争性行业,需要引入竞争机制。

关 键 词:经营者  激励机制  价值创造  动态基础薪酬  
收稿时间:2010-07-19
修稿时间:2011-07-18

Research on Managers' Incentive Mechanism Based on Value Creation and Dynamic Basis Compensation
SUN Shi-min,WANG Ang,JIA Jian-feng. Research on Managers' Incentive Mechanism Based on Value Creation and Dynamic Basis Compensation[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2011, 19(5): 153-159
Authors:SUN Shi-min  WANG Ang  JIA Jian-feng
Affiliation:School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China
Abstract:Nowadays,research on managers' incentive mechanism usually takes net profit as performance standard,applies the system of fixed basis compensation and mostly confines to salary incentive.This paper regards value creation as performance standard,integrates salary and non-salary incentive into managers' incentive model with dynamic basis compensation system and has three conclusions beyond principle-agent model: firstly,the system of dynamic basis compensation may increase manager's effort level;Secondly,the ...
Keywords:managers  incentive mechanism  value creation  dynamic basis compensation  
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