A Hierarchical Process of Applicant Screening by Korean Employers

Korean employers screen job applicants’ detailed personal backgrounds with the intent to discriminate among them. This study develops a statistical model of employers’ problem in recruiting, and identifies a hierarchical process whereby employers screen applicants’ personal characteristics in the diminishing order of their incremental predictive power or increasing order of their cost. Recognizing that benefit of marginal screening depends on information obtained through inframarginal screening, this study evaluates different elements of screening jointly using conditional count-variable and probability models, in a sample of job application forms of 365 firms. Firms are found to screen applicants systematically, according to the information content versus intrusiveness of marginal factors screened—from applicants’ appearance, through lifestyle and background, to detailed health and financial status. Companies’ working conditions, labor costs and labor-organization rate help explain the extent of companies’ screening. Working hours and mandatory compensation in the relevant market are associated positively, and bonuses and discretionary benefits negatively with the extent of screening, agreeing with theoretical predictions. Worker unionization is associated positively with screening, suggesting that unions may be protecting their membership at the cost of harming non-members and propping up firms’ traditional practices. Results for the occurrence of individual screening questions are also reported.