高管政治晋升预期与普通职工薪酬 ——来自国有上市公司的经验证据

以2007—2016年国有上市公司为研究对象,研究了高管政治晋升预期对普通职工薪酬的影响。实证结果表明,国企高管政治晋升预期与普通职工薪酬显著负相关,且高管政治晋升预期越高,普通职工薪酬业绩敏感性越低。进一步研究发现,相对于中央政府控制的国有企业,高管政治晋升预期对普通职工薪酬和薪酬业绩敏感性的负向作用在地方国有企业中更大。当高管政治晋升预期较高时,更倾向于进行低效率过度投资。而企业投资规模越大,普通职工薪酬越低。研究结论不仅为高管政治晋升预期加剧管理层与普通职工之间的代理冲突提供了直接经验证据,也对完善国企高管晋升激励机制和普通职工利益保护具有重要启示。

Top Executives' Political Promotion Expectation and Rank-and-File Employees' Compensation:Empirical Evidence from State-owned Listed Companies

Using the state-owned listed companies during the years from 2007 to 2016 as a research sample, this paper investigates the effect of top executive''s political promotion expectation on rank-and-file employees'' compensation. The empirical results show that top executive''s political promotion expectation is significantly negative related with employees'' compensation. When top executives'' political promotion expectation is high, the pay performance sensitivity of rank-and-file employees is significantly attenuated. Further research finds that:compared with the SOEs controlled by central government, the negative effect of political promotion expectation on the employees'' compensation and pay performance sensitivity is greater in SOEs controlled by local government. When the top executives'' political promotion expectation is relatively high, it tends to the low-efficiency overinvestment. The larger the scale of investment by an enterprise, the lower the rank-and-file employees'' compensation. The research conclusions not only provide the direct empirical evidence to prove that top executives'' political promotion expectation aggravates the agency conflict between management and employees, but also have the important enlightenment to the improvement of incentive mechanism of top executives'' political promotion in the state-owned enterprises and the protection of employees'' interests.