| 创业投资中的契约机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘学林,刘萍萍,韩文秀. 创业投资中的契约机制研究[J]. 天津大学学报(社会科学版), 2008, 10(2): 114-117 |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘学林 刘萍萍 韩文秀 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津大学管理学院,天津,30072 |
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| 摘 要： | 在创业投资过程中，创业投资者、创业投资家与创业企业家之间，存在着双重委托代理关系以及由此所引起的逆向选择与道德风险问题。因此，建立起一个具有良好激励约束监督作用的契约机制至关重要，对此进行了较为详细的理论综述与综合评价。
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| 关 键 词： | 创业投资 委托代理 逆向选择 道德风险 契约机制 |
Research on Contract Mechanism in Venture Investment |
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| LIU Xue-lin,LIU Ping-ping,HAN Wen-xiu. Research on Contract Mechanism in Venture Investment[J]. Journal of Tianjin University(Social Sciences), 2008, 10(2): 114-117 |
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| Authors: | LIU Xue-lin LIU Ping-ping HAN Wen-xiu |
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| Affiliation: | (School of Management, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China) |
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| Abstract: | In the process of venture investment, there exist dual principal-agent relations among venture investor, venture capitalist and entrepreneur, which results in problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Therefore the foundation of a contract mechanism with incentive,restrictive and monitor fimctions is important, which is theoretically analyzed and evaluated. |
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| Keywords: | venture investment principal-agent adverse selection moral hazard contract mechanism |
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