| 城市拆迁谈判问题的经济分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 朱海威,李拂尘,任皓敏,李佩源,纳颖杰.城市拆迁谈判问题的经济分析[J].电子科技大学学报(社会科学版),2011,13(3):14-17. |
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| 作者姓名： | 朱海威 李拂尘 任皓敏 李佩源 纳颖杰 |
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| 作者单位： | 对外经济贸易大学 北京 100029 |
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| 摘 要： | 基于城市拆迁谈判问题的特殊性,运用动态非合作博弈模型,研究拆迁谈判的动态过程及其均衡结果,进而提出改进效率的两点意见。研究结果表明,政府的赔偿经费限制可能会使谈判陷入困境,而化解联盟会为问题的解决提供出路。＂尽早给出合理报价＂和＂化解联盟＂有利于协议的达成。
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| 关 键 词： | 拆迁谈判 非合作博弈 化解联盟 |
Economic Analysis on Negotiations of Urban House Demolition |
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| ZHU Hai-wei,LI Fu-chen,REN Hao-min,LI Pei-yuan,NA Ying-jie.Economic Analysis on Negotiations of Urban House Demolition[J].Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(Social Sciences Edition),2011,13(3):14-17. |
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| Authors: | ZHU Hai-wei LI Fu-chen REN Hao-min LI Pei-yuan NA Ying-jie |
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| Institution: | (University of International Business and Economics Beijing 100029 China) |
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| Abstract: | The paper based on the speciality of the urban house demolition problem,uses dynamic non-cooperative game model to analyze the dynamic process of house demolition negotiation and their equilibrium results,and then provides two suggestions to improve the efficiency.The study results indicate that the limits of compensation might put the negotiation into trouble.However,separating the alliance may solve this problem.Providing a rational price with the least delay and separating the alliance are benefit for final settlement. |
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| Keywords: | negotiations of urban house demolition non-cooperative game separating the alliance |
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