应急救灾三方博弈模型研究

基于大型灾害应急救灾的特征,提出了用于研究中央政府、地方政府和灾民行为的三方博弈模型。首先证明了在满足一定的假设条件下,此三方博弈存在纳什均衡并对均衡点进行分析,其次,研究了此模型框架下的道德风险问题,指出由于政府和灾民的相互不信任导致救灾效率未达到帕累托最优,并同时给出改进效率的一些建议,最后对此三方博弈模型的优缺点进行分析。

Interpret the Jumping Events of Foxconn from Sociological Perspective

Based on the characteristics of large-scale emergency disasters relief,this paper presents a tripartite game model to research the behaviors of the central government,the local government and victims.The study characterizes the optimal state of equilibrium among the players and provides insights into the related institutional arrangement.Next,the study analyses the moral hazard problems of the local government and victims.It shows that the outcome of the game is not efficient and some suggestions are given to enhance the efficiency.Finally,it analyses the merits and shortcomings of the model and presents some concrete proposals for improvement.