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基于“心理成本”的网络版权侵权监管机制演化博弈分析
引用本文:陈威,李思敏,何敏.基于“心理成本”的网络版权侵权监管机制演化博弈分析[J].重庆理工大学学报(社会科学版),2016(3):64-68.
作者姓名:陈威  李思敏  何敏
作者单位:重庆理工大学 会计学院,重庆,400054
摘    要:基于心理成本,利用演化博弈方法对政府监管部门和潜在侵权者之间相互作用的策略进行分析,探索心理效用与侵权行为治理的关系,从而提出完善侵权监管机制的建议。研究发现:网络版权侵权治理的运动执法现象有待解决,上级部门给政府带来的边际心理效用损失增加方式将会影响演化博弈的稳定收敛。为更好保护网络版权,建议从增加政府和潜在侵权者心理效用损失,降低监管成本和侵权行为的额外收益以及提高对于侵权处罚的力度等方面改善现有的网络版权侵权监管机制。

关 键 词:心理成本  网络版权侵权  监管机制  演化博弈

Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis of supervision mechanism of Network Copyright Infringement Based on Psychological Cost
Authors:CHEN Wei  LI Si-min  HE Min
Abstract:Based on the psychological cost,using evolutionary game approach,we analyzed the inter-action of government regulators and potential infringers and explored the relationship between psycho-logical utility and governance of infringement. Then this paper put forward the suggestions to improve the tort supervision mechanism. The research finds that:the campaign-style law enforcement of gov-ernance of Internet copyright infringement need to be resolved,and the psychological utility loss come from superior department will affect the stable convergence of evolutionary game;We put forward sev-eral recommendation for better protecting network copyright,including increasing psychological utility loss of government and potential infringers,reducing the regulatory costs and additional revenue of tort and enhancing the infringement punishment intensity to improve the supervision mechanism of network copyright infringement and so on.
Keywords:psychological cost  network copyright infringement  supervision mechanism  evolution-ary game
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